An agent-based model of supply chain collaboration: Investigating manufacturer loyalty by Niniet Arvitrida (1251540) et al.
Proceedings of the Operational Research Society Simulation Workshop 2016 (SW16)  
A.Anagnostou, K. Hoad, M. Kunc  eds. 
 
 
 
AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF SUPPLY CHAIN COLLABORATION: INVESTIGATING 
MANUFACTURER LOYALTY  
 
 
Niniet I. Arvitrida Prof. Stewart Robinson 
  
Loughborough University Loughborough University 
Loughborough, LE11 3TU, UK Loughborough, LE11 3TU, UK 
N.I.Arvitrida@lboro.ac.uk S.L.Robinson@lboro.ac.uk 
  
  
Dr. Antuela A. Tako Dr. Duncan A. Robertson 
  
Loughborough University Loughborough University 
Loughborough, LE11 3TU, UK Loughborough, LE11 3TU, UK 
A.Takou@lboro.ac.uk D.A.Robertson@lboro.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
Collaboration is considered to be a key driver to supply chain success. However, the ideal collaboration practice is 
difficult to achieve. Firms’ strategy and behaviour in supply chain collaborations are identified as the main reasons 
for supply chain failure. To study this problem, we use an agent-based model which represents two-stage supply 
chains, consisting of customers, manufacturers, and suppliers. The firms exist in a two-dimension supply chain 
strategic space defined by efficiency and responsiveness. In this paper, we examine the effect of manufacturer 
loyalty on supply chains’ performance in an innovative products market from system perspective. Measuring the 
supply chains fill rate and number of surviving supply chains in the market, the results indicate that manufacturer 
loyalty at intermediate levels does not seem to guarantee supply chain success in a market of innovative products, 
unless it is very high or does not exist at all.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) practices are a fundamental determinant of business success. It shifts 
the conventional perspective from firm competition to supply chain competition. This point of view 
makes collaboration between firms in supply chains crucial in achieving supply chain success (Chopra 
and Meindl, 2007; Christopher, 2000; Lee, 2004). However, many firms have failed to establish 
successful collaborations leading to ineffective and inefficient SCM practices (Barratt, 2004; Cao and 
Zhang, 2011; Holweg et al 2005; Lambert and Cooper, 2000).  
According to supply chain literature, collaboration between firms is achieved by maintaining long-
term partnerships and a single supplier. Collaboration strategies in SCM are believed to optimise the 
supply chain’s competitive advantage. Long term collaboration is believed to promote better 
communication between firms and accelerate the innovation process (Boddy et al 1998). Meanwhile, a 
single sourcing strategy for long term collaboration can minimise uncertainties in the supply side (Kraljic, 
1983) and lead time to market (Christopher, 2000), because it can reduce the opportunity for the 
emergence of competition (Lee, 2004). These claims are supported by examples of best practices in SCM, 
which are practiced by successful companies, such as Toyota and Benetton.  
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Despite the benefits of these collaboration strategies, the implementation of these approaches may 
lead to supply chain failure. Some reasons for this could be that these partnership strategies do not suit all 
supply chains. Several findings, such as Anderson and Jap (2005), Burke et al (2007), Leeuw and Fransoo 
(2009), Squire et al (2009), and Sun and Debo (2014), argue that this approach does not always lead to a 
better supply chain performance. Furthermore, researchers in strategic management, such as Porter 
(1997), suggest that single sourcing does not encourage supplier to improve their performance.  
This study aims to obtain a better understanding of collaboration strategies and its effect on the 
supply chain overall. Collaboration is a critical issue in supply chain practice, particularly in 
comprehending collaboration failures. This problem is difficult to observe by using an empirical 
approach, hence we propose to use an agent-based model (ABM). The use of ABM to study collaboration 
in supply chains is still limited to date. Studies that use ABM to study SCM issues focus primarily on 
software architecture than supply chain analysis, such as Barbuceanu et al (1997), Parunak et al (1998), 
Barbuceanu (1999), García-Flores et al (2000), Jiao et al (2006), Kwon et al (2007, 2011), and Siebers 
and Onggo (2014). In addition, ABM research that has addressed collaboration issues in SCM, such as 
Zhu (2008) and Chen et al (2013), only focuses on a single supply chain. They do not examine the supply 
chains at market level, taking a system perspective. 
The work presented in this paper is part of a PhD project that aims to study competition and 
collaboration in supply chains. A previous paper (Arvitrida et al 2015) presented the modelling approach 
of this work. It provided the conceptual model of this study and provided several preliminary results for 
the face validation. The paper does not discuss the effect of particular collaboration behaviour on the 
supply chain. The current paper focuses on collaboration strategies and more specifically examines how 
firms’ behaviour in implementing supply chain collaboration strategies affects supply chains at a market 
level. The main hypothesis examined in the model is that collaboration between firms in the supply chain 
improves the supply chain performance considered from a market level perspective. A two-echelon 
supply chain is modelled, including customers, retailers and suppliers. The model assumes a simplified 
strategic landscape where the agents (customer, retailer, supplier) attempt to reach the best strategic fit on 
two dimension (criteria) responsiveness and efficiency (Chopra and Meindl, 2007). We adopt a theory-
driven approach to develop the model and observe the emerging outcome as a result of the agents’ 
intrinsic behaviour. We examine collaboration at market level, taking a system perspective. This is a 
novel approach that has not been implemented by previous studies in SCM literature. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the agent-based model, 
including the conceptual and computer model. Section 3 explains the experiments and shows some 
preliminary results of the effect of a manufacturer’s collaboration behaviour, which is manufacturer 
loyalty to supplier. Section 4 discusses the results presented in section 3. Finally, section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2 THE AGENT-BASED MODEL OF COLLABORATION IN SUPPLY CHAINS 
In this section, the model applied to this study is described. We adopt the  conceptual modelling 
framework introduced by Robinson (2014), which specifies the following elements of a conceptual 
model: the model contents, inputs or experimental factors, outputs, assumptions and simplifications of the 
model. In this work, the model content incorporates the main features of the ABM North and Macal 
(2007) and Robertson and Caldart (2009) describing the model’s scope and level of detail. 
The contents of the model consist of the agent, the environment, the interaction, and the behavioural 
rules (Figure 1). Three types of agents are simulated in this model: suppliers, manufacturers and 
customers. They are located in a two-dimensional environment of supply chain’s strategic position to 
represent the level of responsiveness and efficiency. Responsiveness, that is described as y-axis, is 
represented as the level of innovation from a customer’s view and manufacturing flexibility from the 
firm’s perspective. Meanwhile, efficiency, depicted on the x-axis, reflects the price and product value 
from the customer’s point of view and operational expenses from the firms’ viewpoint. Within the 
Arvitrida, Robinson, Tako and Robertson 
 
landscape, two infeasible areas are set to reflect the limits to the competitive space. It represents strategic 
positions where a product with a relatively high level of innovation and manufacturing flexibility, it is 
impossible to have a very low price (or cost) and product value, and vice versa.  
The interaction and collaboration behavioural rules are characterised as follows. Customers create 
links with a manufacturer, which represents the decision to purchase the manufacturer’s product. At the 
same time, manufacturers create links with suppliers, which reflect the partnership decision. 
Manufacturers have a loyalty to represent the probability of selecting the same supplier for the next 
collaboration. Suppliers also have loyalty to the manufacturer. It represents the probability that suppliers 
will imitate the manufacturer’s strategic movement to maintain their current partnership. As with 
manufacturer agents, suppliers have a maximum number of relationships with manufacturers. It delineates 
a situation where suppliers can supply more than one manufacturer. The software used in this study is 
NetLogo and the computer representation of the agent-based model is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 The representation of the model (revised from Arvitrida et al 2015) 
 
The key inputs or experimental factors of the model are the collaboration strategy rules. They are the 
duration of collaboration between a manufacturer and a supplier, and the manufacturer maximum number 
of sourcing. The duration of collaboration represents the length of partnership between manufacturers 
and suppliers, and the maximum number of sourcing reflects the manufacturer’s maximum number of 
suppliers allowed to collaborate with. 
The outputs of this model represent the performance of the supply chains at market level. It is 
assessed by supply chains fill rate and the number of supply chains in the market. The supply chains fill 
rate is measured by dividing the number of customers served by the total number of customers in the 
system. Meanwhile, the number of supply chains in the market represents the number of supply chains 
that can survive in the market. For instance, if an experiment ends with only one surviving supply chain, 
it indicates that the collaboration approach pursued does not promote competition in the market. The 
reader is referred to Arvitrida et al (2015) for the further detail. The summary of the conceptual model of 
this study is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1  The conceptual model (revised from Arvitrida et al 2015) 
Model contents 
(Scope and Level of Detail) 
The agent: 
Customers, manufacturers, and suppliers. 
The environment: 
Two-dimensional strategic space defined as the degree of efficiency and responsiveness. 
The interaction: 
Each customer creates a link with a manufacturer, and each manufacturer makes connection/s 
(collaborations) with one or several suppliers. 
The collaboration behavioural rules (autonomy): 
CUSTOMERS 
Each customer selects a manufacturer in accordance with its preference presented by its position. 
MANUFACTURERS 
Each manufacturer selects a supplier based on its preference presented by its position, within a 
probability of manufacturer loyalty to the supplier/s. 
SUPPLIERS 
Suppliers have a probability of loyalty to the manufacturers and maximum number of relationship 
with manufacturers. 
Inputs / Experimental Factors 
Collaboration strategy: 
     1. The duration of collaboration between supplier and manufacturer, and 
     2. Manufacturers' number of sourcing. 
Outputs 
     1. Supply chains fill rate, and 
     2. Number of supply chains in the market. 
 
3 EXPERIMENT AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
In this study, we simulate supply chains that operated in a market of innovative products, such as 
automobile and high technology devices. A thousand customer agents are randomly located within the 
environment of the model. Their position in the grid represents their unique preference to buy a product 
from a manufacturer. They are set to have a very limited degree to compromise with their preference to 
decide which manufacturer is most suitable to supplying their taste or requirement preferences. They will 
only create a link with a manufacturer if the manufacturer stays within their radius of compromise 
measured from their position in the 2-dimensional space. In this experiment, the radius is defined as 10% 
of the diagonal distance of the strategic space. They are also situated to have no loyalty to the 
manufacturer, so they will select another manufacturer if it is closer to their preference than the previous 
one.  
A limited number of manufacturers and suppliers are assigned in the simulation. Ten manufacturer 
and ten supplier agents are set to collaborate and compete with each other. The duration of collaboration 
is homogenously situated to be short-term partnership, which is defined as four ticks. A tick reflects the 
time unit in which a firm can change its strategic position by one grid. We consider that one tick 
represents three months, so that the length of collaboration is set by one year. Manufacturer and supplier 
who cannot manage to find a firm for collaboration will die after they have exceeded a limit to loss, which 
is defined as four ticks or a year.  
A single-sourcing supply chains is applied to the relationship between manufacturer and supplier. It 
means that a manufacturer is only allowed to collaborate with one supplier. This rule also applies to the 
suppliers, which are limited to have only one link with manufacturer. In this situation, the supplier agents 
are programmed to have no loyalty to the manufacturer, so they will move to approach another 
manufacturer instead of following the strategic movement of the currently linked manufacturer.  
 In this paper, we focus on analysing the effect of manufacturer loyalty to the outputs. This variable is 
a representation of manufacturer trust to work with the supplier. The value is defined at five levels (or 
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scenarios) of loyalty as a probability: 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. These values are selected to 
represent these following loyalty degrees: very disloyal (0%), not very disloyal (25%), so-so (50%), not 
very loyal (75%), and very loyal (100 %). These scales are chosen empirically to observe the effect of 
different firms’ level of loyalty on the model outputs. The variation of the variables for the scenarios is 
summarised in Table 2.  
 
Table 2  The scenarios of the experiment 
  
Probability of 
manufacturer loyalty 
Scale 
representation 
Scenario 1 0% Very disloyal 
Scenario 2 25% Not very disloyal 
Scenario 3 50% So-so 
Scenario 4 75% Not very loyal 
Scenario 5 100% Very loyal 
 
 Each scenario is run for 50 replications with 1000 ticks for each replication. We assume a tick 
represents three months to allow a firm to change their strategic position slightly, so 1000 ticks is equal to 
3000 months or 250 years. This time period is considered to be a sensible extreme duration to allow us to 
analyse the performance and survivability of the supply chains in the simulated market. Common random 
numbers are used in the simulations in order to reduce the variations of the simulation outputs (Robinson, 
2014). It means that the similar streams of random numbers are applied for all scenarios. This approach 
can also be applied to reproduce the simulation results for allowing further investigation. 
 We use descriptive and inferential statistical analysis to interpret the simulation results. Boxplots are 
employed to obtain descriptive patterns of the results, and confidence intervals are used to infer the 
significant difference between scenarios. 
3.1 Boxplot Analysis 
Boxplot analysis allows us to describe the data characteristics of the outputs. As shown by Figure 2, the 
boxplots shows that there is a pattern for the effect of manufacturer loyalty to both supply chains fill rate 
and number of supply chains in the market.  
Figure 2a indicates that the median and the mean of supply chains fill rate have a slight U pattern as 
the probability of manufacturer loyalty increases. In scenario 1 (manufacturer loyalty is 0%), the median 
of supply chains fill rate is 9.3% and the mean is 10.47%. Then, both values gradually decrease as the 
probability of manufacturer loyalty increases up to 75% (scenario 4). The values rise to 14.3% for the 
median and 14.37% for the mean when the manufacturer loyalty is 100% (scenario 5). In the last 
scenario, the model provides the highest outputs comparing to other scenarios.  
 Meanwhile, the median and the mean of the number of supply chains in the market also depicts a 
slight U shape (Figure 2b). Both the median and the mean of the output decrease from 3 supply chains to 
2 supply chains, from scenario 1 to scenario 2 (manufacturer loyalty is 25%). The values do not change 
until the manufacturer loyalty is 75% in scenario 4. In the last scenario, both values increase to 4 supply 
chains. 
The variation of the simulation outputs can also be observed by looking at the tall of both boxplots. 
The charts show that the highest variations of both outputs are in scenario 5, where 100% of manufacturer 
loyalty is applied. The first scenario provides the second highest variation, while the others (scenario 2, 3, 
and 4) reveal the same values of the outputs.  
In general, the boxplots indicate that 100% of manufacturer loyalty has the greatest effect to both 
supply chains fill rate and “the number of supply chains in the market”, and 0% of manufacturer loyalty 
provides the second highest outputs. It also implies that scenario 2, 3, and 4 provides no different effect to 
the simulation outputs. 
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Figure 2 Boxplots of the model outputs with a line of mean values for all scenarios of manufacturer loyalty.  
a)  Supply chains fill rate. b) Number of supply chains in the market 
 
3.2 Confidence Intervals for Multiple Comparisons 
Confidence intervals are constructed with 10% level of overall significance in order to infer whether there 
is a statistically significant difference between scenarios. If the confidence interval includes zero, it can be 
concluded that there is insignificant difference between the scenarios. Since ten confidence intervals are 
developed for the comparisons, Bonferroni inequality is used to adjust the level of significance outputs 
(Robinson, 2014). In other words, the individual level of significance for each confidence interval is 
10/10 = 1%. 
 With 90% confidence intervals, the manufacturer loyalty provides almost similar pattern as the 
boxplots for supply chains fill rate. As shown by Table 3, scenario 5 (100%) is significantly different 
from other scenarios for all individual comparisons. It provides the highest value of supply chains fill 
rate. Scenario 1 (0%) also has significant difference from the others, but it is indifferent with scenario 2 
(25%). It has higher supply chains fill rate comparing to scenario 3 (50%) and 4 (75%), but it is lower 
than scenario 5. Scenario 2 (25%) is significantly different from scenario 4 and 5, but it is insignificant 
with scenario 1 and 3. It provides higher supply chains fill rate than scenario 4, but it is lower than 
scenario 5. Scenario 3 (50%) is only significantly different from scenario 1 and 5. It has lower supply 
chains fill rate than scenario 1 and 5. Lastly, the supply chains fill rate in scenario 4 (75%) is significantly 
lower comparing to scenario 1, 2, and 5.  
  
 
Table 3  Confidence interval comparison of supply chains fill rate between all scenarios of manufacturer loyalty 
(presented in percentage, with overall confidence interval ≥ 90%)  
Scenario  2 (25%) 
3 
(50%) 
4 
(75%) 
5 
(100%) 
1 
(0%) 
(‐1.44, 2.81)  (0.29, 3.69)  (0.89, 4.29)  (‐6.65, ‐1.15) 
No difference  Scen.1 (0%) > Scen.3 (50%)  Scen.1 (0%) > Scen.4 (75%)  Scen.1 (0%) < Scen.5 (100%) 
2 
(25%)     (‐0.66, 3.28)  (0.14, 3.67)  (‐7.37, ‐1.79)    No difference  Scen.2 (25%) > Scen.3 (75%)  Scen.2 (25%) < Scen.5 (100%) 
3 
(50%) 
      (‐0.97, 2.16)  (‐8.44, ‐3.34) 
      No difference  Scen.3 (50%) < Scen.5 (100%) 
4 
(75%) 
         (‐8.98, ‐4) 
         Scen.4 (75%) < Scen.5 (100%)
 
 A similar approach is used to infer the difference between scenarios for the number of supply chains 
in the market (Table 4).  In general, scenario 5 (100%) provides a significantly higher number of supply 
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chains in the market than other scenarios, particularly when it is compared to scenario 2, 3, and 4. It is 
considered to be only insignificantly different when it is compared to scenario 1. Scenario 1 (0%) is only 
significantly differential from scenario 3. It generates more number of supply chains in the market than 
scenario 3. Finally, insignificant difference between scenarios is concluded for the remaining 
comparisons. 
 
Table 4  Confidence interval comparison of number of supply chains in the market between all scenarios of 
manufacturer loyalty (with overall confidence interval ≥ 90%) 
 
Scenario  2 (25%) 
3 
(50%) 
4 
(75%) 
5 
(100%) 
1 
(0%) 
(0, 2)  (0, 2)  (1, 2)  (‐2, 0) 
No difference  No difference  Scen.1 (0%) > Scen.4 (75%)  No difference 
2 
(25%) 
   (0, 1)  (0, 1)  (‐2, ‐1) 
   No difference No difference Scen.2 (25%) < Scen.5 (100%)
3 
(50%) 
      (0, 1)  (‐3, ‐1) 
      No difference  Scen.3 (50%) < Scen.5 (100%) 
4 
(75%) 
         (‐3, ‐2) 
      Scen.4 (75%) < Scen.5 (100%)
 
4 DISCUSSIONS 
Both the boxplots and confidence interval analysis indicate that very loyal manufacturers (when 
manufacturer loyalty is 100%) can lead to better supply chain performance in the market. The supply 
chains fill rate is significantly higher compared to collaboration with less manufacturer loyalty. It also 
generates more supply chains in the market compared to the other scenarios. This outcome is consistent 
with the concept of achieving supply chain collaboration success believed by most supply chain experts, 
such as Chopra and Meindl (2007), Christopher (2000), Lee (2004), Simchi-Levi et al (2000). They claim 
that a firm’s trust, represented by loyalty in this study, is critical to support collaboration in supply chains 
to achieve a better performance and resilience. 
However, disloyal manufacturers (when manufacturer loyalty is 0%) also provide a better supply 
chains fill rate and number of supply chains in the market as opposed to the in between degrees of 
manufacturer loyalty. Even though the outputs are lower than the results of 100% manufacturer loyalty, it 
is significantly higher than having a moderate degree of loyalty.  
This result is counterintuitive with the current SCM concept of achieving supply chain success 
through collaboration achievement. A possible explanation for this could be that when all manufacturers 
in the market are disloyal with the suppliers, it can support a perfect competition environment that 
benefits the supply chain as a system. In other words, extreme loyalty (0% and 100%) can enhance the 
performance of all supply chains to serve the market. 
In general, these results suggest that the firms’ collaborative behaviour affects the supply chains in 
the market. It contributes to the overall service level of all supply chains in the market, represented by the 
supply chains fill rate, and the number of supply chains who can survive in the market. We consider that a 
higher supply chains fill rate is better for the market because more demand can be fulfilled. Meanwhile, 
the more supply chains that can survive in the market do not always represent a better performance for the 
market. However, this measure is useful to understand how the number of supply chains is decreased 
during the simulation run. The shrinkage of this output in the simulation represents the number of supply 
chain collaboration failure in the market. Moreover, if the simulation ends where only one supply chain 
survives in the market, it suggests that the behavioural rules implemented to the simulation potentially 
leads to a monopoly situation. If this occurs, it indicates that market intervention may be required to 
prevent it from happening. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
An agent-based model of collaboration in supply chains has been developed in this study. An experiment 
on supply chains of innovative products is performed to examine the effect of manufacturer loyalty to the 
supply chains fill rate and number of supply chains in the market.  
  The preliminary runs of the model show that the manufacturer loyalty affects market performance, in 
terms of the supply chains fill rate and number of supply chains in the market. If manufacturers are 
perfectly loyal to the supplier, by choosing the same supplier every period, it would lead to a higher 
supply chains fill rate and a higher number of supply chains in the market. On the other hand, when a 
manufacturer has no loyalty to the supplier, the supply chains fill rate and number of supply chains in the 
market are notably higher compared to when a manufacturer has a moderate degree of loyalty. These 
results are contradictory with the current concept of SCM even though very loyal manufacturers generate 
better supply chains fill rate and more number of supply chains in the market rather than very disloyal 
manufacturers. 
The experiments performed in this paper consider only one aspect of supply chain collaboration in the 
market, supply chain loyalty. As a next step we plan to consider further aspects of collaboration and 
competition behaviour, including the distance of manufacturer strategic movement, supplier loyalty, and 
the supplier’s maximum number of relationships. The results are also analysed by disregarding the 
interaction between collaboration factors, such as duration of collaboration and number of sourcing. A 
similar analysis is also under way considering supply chain competition. Varying the model content, such 
as supply and demand characteristics, will also be simulated in the future in order to gain a better 
understanding of collaboration in the supply chain. Moreover, several case studies will be used to test the 
model. 
The model presented in this study represents the strategic space and firm behaviour in a very 
simplified fashion. However, it can be extended to address more supply chain issues, such as 
collaboration in functional products market, to study the market at a system level. Moreover, 
incorporating a learning capability for each agent and providing alternative measures of performance 
could enrich the model. 
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